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Environmental Regulations and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership: Using Investor-State Dispute Settlement to
Strengthen Environmental Law
Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson†
ABSTRACT

The highly publicized Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement
has reignited a long-running debate between environmentalists and free
trade advocates about the impacts of the investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) system on the global economy and environmental preservation.
The ISDS provision potentially gives foreign investors the right to challenge domestic regulations intending to protect the environment if those
regulations discriminate against foreign investors and result in substantial monetary loss to the investors’ property. Critics of the TPP argue
that we should learn from the troubling legacy of the North American
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which, according to critics, overwhelmingly
favored investors over states and domestic environmental concerns. Given the similarities between the TPP and NAFTA, critics argue that the
TPP will similarly favor the rights of foreign investors over environmental regulations. Proponents of ISDS argue that the ISDS system as a
whole provides much needed recourse to investors, fosters economic development, and strengthens the rule of law. Furthermore, many proponents argue the TPP provides far greater protections than NAFTA to
host-state governments regulating for the public good, and, nonetheless,
NAFTA jurisprudence is not as investor-friendly as critics contend. The
purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between ISDS and
environmental regulations pursued by host-states in an effort to determine whether member countries can realistically enact legislation to
protect the environment when they are signatories to the TPP.

†) Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson graduated from Seattle University School of Law magna cum
laude in May 2017, with a focused study in international law. Ms. Chiong-Martinson served as the
Managing Editor for the Seattle Journal of Environmental Law. She would like to thank her family
and friends for their unrelenting support and encouragement, as she pursued her interest in international business litigation and arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 5, 2015, following years of negotiations, the United
States and eleven other Pacific Rim nations reached a final agreement on
arguably the largest regional trade agreement in history – the TransPacific Partnership (TPP).1 The TPP is one of the most ambitious free
trade agreements ever signed, aiming to foster trade, boost domestic
growth, and forge closer relationships on economic policies and regula1
Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-tradedeal-is-reached.html?_r=0.
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tion between the twelve participating member countries.2 Although trade
ministers have reached an agreement on the trade deal, this is only the
first step in a looming and complex political fight; the twelve nations
have two years to ratify or reject the pact, and the agreement will face
months of scrutiny in Congress.3 While numerous aspects of the TPP
have become the subject of great contention, there is one facet of the
agreement that has received an exorbitant amount of criticism – the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provision.4 In short, ISDS is a legal mechanism that gives foreign investors the right to challenge government regulations by suing host-state governments through ad hoc arbitration proceedings, rather than domestic administrative and judicial
channels, on the grounds that the government violated the rights guaranteed to the investor under a particular trade agreement or treaty.5 At its
most basic level, ISDS enables a foreign investor to sue the government
of a country where the investor does business if the government is signatory to a trade agreement that includes an ISDS provision, and the government implements regulations that violate the investor’s rights as negotiated and established in the agreement.
Although ISDS mechanisms already exist in many other trade
and investment treaties, the highly publicized TPP agreement has reignited a long-running debate between environmentalists and advocates of
free trade about the impacts of ISDS on the global economy and environmental preservation. Both critics and proponents of ISDS tend to concede that the ISDS system has opened the door for corporations to sue
state governments over newly enacted regulatory frameworks, such as
those aimed at environmental protection and sustainability.6 Where the
critics and proponents differ, however, is in their assessment of the potential costs or benefits this modern right to arbitration will have on foreign investors, host-state governments, and the environment in general.
The ISDS debate became a feature of mainstream political discourse following the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in the ‘90s, and has recently been revived on account of the
TPP and the 2016 presidential election. As governments and policy mak2
TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/business32498715.
3
Mara Liasson, Obama Begins Sales Pitch To Congress On Trans-Pacific Partnership, NPR
(Oct. 06, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/06/446370835/obama-begins-sales-pitch-to-congresson-trans-pacific-partnership.
4
Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 23,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389/.
5
Lisa Johnson, Lisa Sachs and Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development,
CCSI Policy Paper, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law (May
2015), available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-PublicInterest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf.
6
Tamara L. Slater, Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic Environmental Protection, 14
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131 (2015).
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ers become increasingly focused on protecting the environment, the
number of environmental regulations that impact foreign investors will
most likely intensify, resulting in an increase in ISDS claims brought by
investors against host-states.7 For all of these reasons, the ISDS debate
has perhaps never been as relevant as it is today.
While there are strong arguments to be made from either side of
the ISDS debate, much of the discussion surrounding the legitimacy of
ISDS is based on somewhat skewed and limited information, rather than
facts and balanced representations. On one hand, critics argue that the
inclusion of ISDS provisions in trade agreements allow multinational
corporations to override government policy and undermine state sovereignty.8 Critics of the ISDS system often identify ISDS cases brought
under the NAFTA where tribunals found in favor of foreign investors
challenging the host-state’s environmental regulations as evidence of the
dangerous impacts ISDS can have on the environment.9 According to
critics, the ISDS provision in the TPP mirrors the provision in NAFTA,
suggesting that the TPP will similarly empower foreign investors to
freely challenge host-state environmental regulations.10 On the other
hand, according to ISDS proponents, ISDS does not limit the ability of
governments to regulate, but rather gives foreign investors much needed
redress if they are unfairly treated, representing a major advance in the
fair treatment of foreign businesses and the peaceful resolution of disputes.11 Rather than abdicating sovereignty, proponents of ISDS argue
that entering into trade and investment agreements is an exercise of the
sovereign’s right to decide which obligations they wish to include in a
treaty.12
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between
ISDS, as a mechanism of free trade, and environmental regulations pursued by host-states in an effort to determine whether member countries
can realistically enact legislation to protect the environment when they
are signatories to the TPP. The overall utility of ISDS, or conversely the
potential dangers it poses to the environment, depends on the resolution
of a few essential questions. First, how should we assess whether ISDS is
7

Id.
James Surowiecki, Trade-Agreement Troubles, NEW YORKER (Jun. 22, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/trade-agreement-troubles.
9
Setting the Record Straight: Debunking Ten Common Defenses of Controversial InvestorState Corporate Privileges, PUBLICCITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/documents/ustr-isdsresponse.pdf.
10
Mark Weisbrot, Lessons from NAFTA for the TPP, HUFFINGTON POST: THE WORLD POST
(Oct. 22, 2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrot/lessons-from-nafta-forth_b_8315512.html.
11
Scott Miller and Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Jan. 2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/150116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf.
12
Morrison, supra note 4.
8
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an effective tool for balancing foreign investment and environmental
protection? Second, what rights does the TPP preserve for investors and
for governments intending to pass environmental legislation? Lastly,
does or can the TPP protect the interest of both? Bringing together both
sides of the ISDS argument, this paper concludes that the ISDS provision
contained in the TPP has some significant differences from NAFTA, and
that NAFTA investment arbitration jurisprudence isn’t necessarily as
pro-investor as some critics might believe. Given these determinations, it
is the opinion of the author that the ISDS provision in the TPP actually
has the potential to strengthen host-state environmental regulations, but
only if there are a few significant reforms made to the existing system.
First, with the aim of enhancing legal certainty and predictability, the international community should make serious efforts to harmonize the rules governing international investment arbitration. Second, in
the area of procedural reforms, foreign investors should always be required to carry the burden of paying the host-state’s legal fees if the arbitrators decide the case is frivolous or rule in the government’s favor; this
would discourage investors from pursuing frivolous claims against hoststates and strengthen the utility of investment arbitration as a more economical and efficient alternative to litigation. Finally, there must be
greater transparency so arbitral decisions can begin to create precedent,
or customary international law, which would provide the current system
a framework for more consistent investor arbitration jurisprudence. With
these procedural and substantive reforms, the ISDS provision in the TPP
has the potential to protect and strengthen each member state’s ability to
enact or maintain environmental regulations.
This article seeks to facilitate a robust, even-handed, and careful
discussion about ISDS and the environment, with a particular emphasis
on the foreseeable benefits and dangers posed to future environmental
regulations pursued by parties to the TPP. Parts II through V of this article establish the overarching historical and legal framework of the ISDS
system, focusing specifically on NAFTA and the TPP, in an effort to
contextualize the current ISDS debate. Part II explores the rise of ISDS
and establishes the theoretical and doctrinal framework for ISDS that
arose out of its historical context. Part III examines the legal framework
applicable to ISDS, which consists of international trade law, investor
arbitration, and free trade agreements. Building upon the legal framework, Part IV looks specifically at the Investment Chapters and ISDS
provisions in both NAFTA and the TPP, comparing the important similarities and difference between the agreements. Part V shifts focus to environmental law disputes that were brought under the auspices of
NAFTA in an effort to establish the current state of NAFTA arbitration
jurisprudence.
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Having established the historical and legal foundation for the
TPP’s ISDS provision, Part VI gets to the substance of the ISDS debate,
summarizing the arguments for and against the ISDS system, consolidating the most compelling arguments, and proposing specific reforms that
may potentially enable the ISDS system to actually strengthen environmental reforms and free trade.
I. BACKGROUND TO ISDS
In the 1980s and ‘90s, foreign-direct investment by private sector
corporations emerged as a dominant source of capital for developing
countries and remains one of the leading sources of economic activity in
our increasingly borderless world.13 As global economic activity has continued to expand, resulting in larger levels of international investment
activity, international investment law has evolved into an increasingly
relevant body of law for both the public and private sectors.14 One of the
most significant developments within the quickly expanding area of international investment law was the emergence of a variety of trade
agreements seeking to promote foreign direct investment by providing
foreign investors with greater security and transparency, such as multilateral “free trade” agreements formed between multiple countries and
bilateral investment treaties formed between two countries. International
investment treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, offer substantive
investment rights to corporations and contain provisions requiring states
to arbitrate substantive violations, commonly known as ISDS provisions.
ISDS provisions enable foreign investors to file claims against
governments in an international arbitration forum, as long as the investor
is covered by a trade agreement between the investor’s home country and
the host country that includes an ISDS provision.15 Perhaps the most
well-known ISDS provision is found in the Investment Chapter of
NAFTA (hereinafter Chapter 11), which specifically identifies the minimum standards for treatment of investors, enables corporations to sue
host-state governments for laws or judicial decisions that infringe upon
their rights, and establishes procedures for ISDS arbitration.16 The text of
Chapter 11 is largely reflected in both the TPP and the Transatlantic

13
Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf.
14
Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 13, 18 (2014).
15
Slater, supra note 6, at 133.
16
Charles N. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 48 (2001).
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Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)17 that is currently being negotiated.
Historically, investors had few options for resolving disputes
arising from lost profits caused by government activity.18 Prior to ISDS,
the options available to investors were generally quite limited; the investor could accept lost profits as a cost of doing business, obtain political
risk insurance, or rely on its home state to invoke its diplomatic rights on
the investor’s behalf.19 In essence, prior to the emergence of ISDS, disputes involving government regulations and the resulting decrease in the
value of property owned by foreign investors were treated as domestic
conflicts.20 Against this unsatisfactory backdrop, states and investors began using ISDS provisions to permit international arbitration of international investment law obligations.
In theory, ISDS was intended to benefit both host-states and foreign investors by leveling the investment playing field and fostering the
neutral adjudication of investment disputes in a manner designed to minimize commercial risk and political risk, while maximizing the rule of
law.21 Through the establishment of a trans-national system for dispute
resolution, foreign investors were able to avoid the potential difficulties
they might face in a host-state domestic court system, such as ineffective
domestic judicial systems or political influence.22 Essentially, at its inception, the net objective of the ISDS system was to encourage foreign
investment by protecting the rights of foreign investors and shielding
host-states from incurring liability.23
The procedural qualities of the ISDS arbitration system are quite
straightforward. Trade agreements that include ISDS provisions provide
clear dispute resolution rights to foreign investors, such as the right to
binding arbitration. In general, trade agreement with ISDS provisions
include certain jurisdictional prerequisites that must be met before an
investor is permitted to bring a claim against a host-state to a tribunal.24
For example, most trade or investment agreements require an investor to
first attempt to amicably resolve the dispute and comply with the proper

17
USTR, White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)
(June 2013), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip.
18
Franck, supra note 14, at 19.
19
Id.
20
Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’S Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical
Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 465, 478-79 (2013).
21
Franck, supra note 14, at 20.
22
William Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The New Face of Investment Arbitration:
NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2003).
23
Franck, supra note 14, at 20.
24
Id. at 22.
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notification requirements for instigating a dispute before the investor
may bring an ISDS claim against a state.25
The substantive qualities of trade agreements involve promises
from states to foreign investors that investors will receive certain minimal treatment, such as the right to freedom from expropriation and discrimination, and guarantees of fair and equitable treatment.26 These
rights are explicitly stated in the trade agreement, usually in the agreement’s Investment Chapter, and are protected through the agreement’s
requirement that host states must refrain from violating the investor’s
substantive treaty rights. When an investor believes the host-state has
violated its rights, the trade agreement permits direct redress against the
host state through the ISDS mechanism if the challenged government
action or regulation fails to meet certain standards of treatment required
under the agreement and results in economic harm to the investor.27 In
sum, a cause of action brought under the ISDS provision of a trade
agreement generally involves an investor’s claim that the host state violated the investor’s protected rights, and the violation caused monetary
damage to the investor.
Before delving directly into the legal framework in which ISDS
is situated, it is important to note that the ISDS system implicates various
bodies of international and domestic law. While it is more straightforward to evaluate the ISDS system through one lens rather than many,
whether it be from the perspective of environmentalists or trade advocates, the unique positioning of the ISDS system at the intersection of
various bodies of law makes this almost impossible. Therefore, in continuing to build the ISDS framework as the foundation for the ISDS debate, the following three sections discuss ISDS from three important and
interrelated standpoints: Part III discusses international trade law, free
trade agreements, and investment arbitration; Part IV compares the Investment Chapters of NAFTA and the TPP; and Part V shifts to environmental law and NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence.

25

Id. at 20.
Joseph Stiglitz, In 2016, let’s hope for better trade agreements – the death of TPP, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/10/in-2016-better-tradeagreements-trans-pacific-partnership.
27
Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CATO INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purgenegotiations-investor-state.
26
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II. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. International Trade Law and Free Trade Agreements
On October 30, 1947, twenty-three countries signed the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is considered to be the
moment at which modern international trade law was first codified.28 The
GATT was the governing document for international trade until the parties to the GATT established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
incorporated the GATT therein.29 The ultimate purpose of the WTO was
to provide uniform trade laws, aid in resolving trade disputes, and to facilitate global trade.30 Thus, to avoid disputes and assure uniformity, the
WTO requires that all members treat other members with “most favored
nation” status, meaning the lowest tariff rate one WTO member gives
any country is the tariff rate that all WTO members shall receive.31 There
was one important exception to the “most favored nation” requirement
explicitly written into the WTO regime – the specific exception for contracting parties to avoid the “most favored nation” requirement when
entering into free trade agreements.32 Under the WTO, free trade agreements are effectively permitted to allow for preferential treatment among
contracting countries.
The WTO’s allowance for preferential treatment in free trade
agreements resulted in a rapid increase in the number of free trade
agreements, growing international unrest about the terms of these agreements, and the rise of ISDS provisions. As of June 2014, 585 regional
trade agreements have been reported to the WTO, with 379 in force.33 As
of 2012, there were nearly 3,200 bilateral trade agreements, and a comparable increase in multilateral trade agreements.34 While some commentators maintain that free trade agreements provide stability for commercial transactions, many of the recently negotiated free trade agreements
have sparked major protests by activists concerned about labor rights,
environmental sustainability, exploitation of developing nations, and a
range of other social issues.35
28
Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE, 641-42
(LEXISNEXIS, 3d ed. 2008).
29
Id. at 607.
30
What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
31
Bhala, supra note 29, at Chapter 11.
32
According to GATT Article XXIV, “the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
…” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 1583, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.
33
Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/htm.
34
Slater, supra note 6, at 136.
35
Id.
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B. Investment Arbitration: ISDS Provisions and Procedures
The applicability of international trade law to investment disputes is expressly derived from the terms of a free trade agreement and
inclusion of an ISDS provision. For example, imagine that the United
States and Chile are parties to a multilateral trade agreement that contains an ISDS provision, such as the TPP or NAFTA. An American company decides to invest in a timber manufacturer in Chile that will stimulate the Chilean economy by exporting timber products worldwide. The
American company satisfies all government regulations, obtains the requisite permits, and invests millions of dollars to construct the facilities
for timber production and manufacturing. Months after the company
commences operations, the Chilean government enacts environmental
regulations that make it nearly impossible for the company to pursue its
business objectives. The regulations require foreign-owned timber companies to limit exports to a government-approved number and pay a 25
percent assessment on all revenues to fund domestic research into sustainable development projects. The American company believes that the
new regulations damage the company’s investment by minimizing expected profits, while providing Chilean timber companies with an unfair
advantage to carry out their business without being limited by the regulations. Under international trade law, the American company would most
likely pursue recourse through binding arbitration, bringing a claim
against the Chilean government on the grounds that the government violated the company’s rights under the applicable trade agreement.
While international trade agreements vary in their terms and content, foreign investors pursuing ISDS claims are generally permitted to
elect to arbitrate before a variety of tribunals. The most commonly used
forum for international investment arbitration is the International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the second most
commonly used forum is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).36 Although each forum has its own set of
rules, amendable by contract, the rules generally follow the same pattern
and establish baseline requirements for each stage of arbitration, such as
the proper method for filing pleadings, selecting a tribunal or challenging
arbitrators, gathering evidence, and issuing a final award.37
Nearly all free trade agreements provide investors with a private
right of action through ICSID arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration rules established by the ICSID or UNCITRAL.38 Under both the
ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, consent to arbitration occurs when a sov36

Id. at 138.
Franck, supra note 14, at 22-3.
38
Kate M. Supnik, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing
Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L. J. 343, 351 (2009).
37
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ereign state signs a free trade agreement that contains an ISDS provision
allowing investors from another state to submit claims against it, such as
in the timber manufacturer example discussed above.39 The standard
ISDS tribunal is comprised of three arbitrators, one appointed by each
party to the dispute and the third appointed by the party-selected arbitrators.40 Where an investment dispute is submitted under either the ICSID
or UNCITRAL rules, as a default position, tribunals are required to decide disputes in accordance with the host state’s domestic laws and the
applicable “rules of international law.”41 Under both the ICSID and
UNCITRAL rules, much deference is given to the arbiters in almost every aspect of the proceeding.
C. Free Trade Agreements: Substantive Rules and Principles
Arguably the most ambitious and controversial characteristic of
free trade agreements, in terms of both their purposes and goals, is their
attempt to strike a balance between protecting the rights of foreign investors and maintaining a narrow police powers carve-out for participating
governments. On one hand, the overwhelming majority of trade agreements include provisions that promote non-discrimination and require
host states to compensate investors in the event that expropriation or regulatory measures negatively impact the value of the investor’s investment. On the other hand, most trade agreements also protect host-states
from compensating investors if the government’s conduct falls within the
scope of the police powers carve-out for regulations designed to protect
the public good. Additionally, as seen in the more recent trade agreements such as the TPP, drafters may even include specific provisions that
address the environment and specifically the host’s right to regulate in
this area.42
39

Id. at 352.
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Diana Rosert, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Opportunities to Reform Arbitral Rules and Processes, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Jan. 2014),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2014/investment_treaty_arbitration.pdf.
41
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, art. 42, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
The United States is a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention. A list of signatories is available at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028012a925. The enabling legislation
in the United States is embodied in 22 U.S.C. §§1650, 1650a (1982).
42
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Chapter
9, Article 9.10(3)(d), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf
[hereinafter TPP]. According to this provision, a Party is not prevented from adopting or maintaining
measure, including environmental measures:
40

(i) necessary to secured compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with
this Agreement;
(ii) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or
(iii) related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.
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At the most basic level, trade agreements provide two areas of
protection for investors and one for the government. The first level of
protection offered to investors is found in expropriation clauses, which
prohibit host-states from expropriating or nationalizing an investor’s investment. These clauses appear in almost all of the more than 2,200 bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, including NAFTA, the Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade Agreement, and the TPP.43
The second level of protection offered to investors is comprised in three
extremely common non-discrimination provisions, namely the “National
Treatment,” “Most-Favored-Nation,” and “Minimum Standard of Treatment” clauses.44 Under the “National Treatment” clause, host-states must
treat foreign investors no less favorably than domestic investors in similar circumstances.45 In a similar vein, the “Most-Favored-Nation” clause
guarantee investors treatment at least as good as that received by investors from any other foreign country.46 The “Minimum Standard of
Treatment” clause simply reiterates that investors are guaranteed “fair
and equitable treatment.”47
The most explicit protection provided for host-state governments
is found in the form of exceptions to expropriation clauses. Under most
free trade agreements, the host-state has the right to regulate for a public
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, so long as compensation is duly paid to investors.48 While this has traditionally been the full extent of
the police powers carve out, modern ISDS jurisprudence has acknowledged that certain non-discriminatory regulations, when exercised within
the state’s police powers, might not require compensation when the government is acting solely in the public interest.49 Furthermore, there is certainly an argument to be made that modern trade agreements have expanded the boundaries on what qualifies as a non-compensatory regulation by explicitly including provisions recognizing a host’s ability to regulate on public welfare objectives, such as public health and the environment.
Having generally established the international trade law framework for the ISDS system, the following section will discuss and compare the rights reserved for both investors and host-states under NAFTA
TPP, Article 9.10(3)(d).
See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1110, 1106, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; TPP, supra note 42, art. 9.8.
44
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and the TPP. This comparative analysis will provide another layer of
foundation to the ISDS debate concerning the potentially damaging or
beneficial impacts ISDS may have on a host-state’s ability to protect the
environment.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: NAFTA AND THE TPP
This section develops a comparative analysis between NAFTA
and the TPP, which will provide the foundation for analyzing whether
environmental regulations will thrive or be chilled under the TPP. Because the TPP has largely been modeled after NAFTA, including the
ISDS provision, many of the criticisms surrounding the TPP are based on
the presumption that the TPP will follow in NAFTA’s footsteps.
A. The North American Trade Agreement
In ratifying NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United States resolved to “ensure a predictable commercial framework for business
planning and investment,”50 “increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories,”51 and “create effective procedures for . . . the
resolution of disputes.”52 Chapter 11 of NAFTA, arguably one of the
most well known Investment Chapters of any free trade agreement, identifies the standards for treatment of investors and establishes procedures
for arbitration of investor-state disputes. If an investor chooses to move
forward with arbitration, the proceedings employ rules from either
UNCITRAL or ICSID.53 Under NAFTA, respondent states are responsible for the actions of both the state and their subdivisions that amount to
a violation of any of the investor rights contained in Chapter 11.
1. Non-Discrimination
The first five guarantees in Chapter 11 of NAFTA provide investors with substantive non-discrimination rights. Articles 1102 and 1103
require NAFTA parties to treat each others’ investors in accordance with
the relative standards of “National Treatment” and “Most-FavoredNation” treatment.54 Article 1104 reaffirms that parties must accord investors and their investments the “better treatment” required by Articles
1102 and 1203,55 while Article 1105 establishes a “Minimum Standard of
50
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Treatment,” mandating treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment.56
Article 1106 contains the fifth guarantee under Chapter 11, and
is also where NAFTA’s first reference to a fairly indiscrete police power
carve-out is located. Article 1106 expressly prohibits certain “Performance Requirements,” including requirements to export a given level or
percentage of goods or services, or to achieve a given level or percentage
of domestic content.57 Following an extensive list of requirements, commitments, or undertakings that would constitute an illicit performance
requirement under the agreement, the final paragraph of Article 1106
states that “nothing . . . shall not be construed to prevent any Party from
adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental measures,”
that are “(a) necessary to secure compliance with the laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with . . . this Agreement; (b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health; or (c) necessary for the
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.”58
2. Expropriation and Compensation
Articles 1110 and 1106 comprise NAFTA’s expropriation regime. Article 1110 explicitly permits expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation so long as the host-state’s conduct was done solely for a public purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in accordance with
due process of the law and the minimum standard of treatment required
under Chapter 11, and upon prompt compensation equal to the fair market value for the expropriated investment.59 Given the “public purpose”
and “fair market value” requirements, Article 1110 has been described as
strikingly similar to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, with the “public purpose” requirements taken directly
from the text and the “fair market value” imported from Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.60
3. Arbitration Rules and Procedures
Section B of Chapter 11 secures the obligations under Section A
by “establish[ing] a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes
that assures both equal treatment among investors and the Parties . . . and
due process before an impartial tribunal.”61 Thus, under Section B,
NAFTA parties have consented to investor-state arbitration; their consent
56
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represents a standing offer to foreign investors to resolve their disputes
via binding arbitration under the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules.62 Although the arbitration rules selected by the investor will govern the proceedings, Section B modifies the rules by creating a limited right of audience for non-disputing NAFTA Parties, identifying the proper law for
Chapter 11 disputes, and imposing strict limits on the form of interim
and final relief that Chapter 11 tribunals may award.63 In their final
awards, tribunals may only grant compensatory damages plus interest,
restitution of property, and the cost of arbitration.64
B. The Trans-Pacific Partnership
According to the website recently launched by the U.S. Trade
Office for the sole purpose of explaining and clarifying the TPP, the purpose of the treaty’s ISDS provision is to strengthen the rule of law in the
Asia-Pacific region, deter foreign governments from imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements on American investors, and to protect the
right to regulate in the public interest.65 To accomplish these objectives,
the TPP’s Investment Chapter ensures that American investors will have
effective remedies in the event of breach of their rights through the ISDS
system.66
1. Non-Discrimination
Chapter 9, Section A of the TPP contains non-discrimination
rules that are almost identical to the rights contained in the text of
NAFTA, specifically the rights of “National Treatment,” “Most Favored
Nation,” and “Minimum Treatment.”67 According to Article 9.4, the right
of “National Treatment” requires member states to treat foreign investors
no less favorably than the state treats its own investors in similar circumstances.68 Article 9.5 is the TPP’s “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment”
provision, according to which “[e]ach party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords . . . to investors
of any other party.”69 Finally, Article 9.6 establishes the right to a minimum standard of treatment, requiring host-states to treat foreign invest-
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ments in accordance with customary international law, including fair and
equitable treatment, and full protection and security.70
Although the TPP largely resembles NAFTA in this area, the
TPP expands upon NAFTA’s rules of non-discrimination by clarifying
key concepts in the non-discrimination and minimum standard of treatment obligations. In particular, the TPP clarifies that a legitimate public
welfare objective is significant in the non-discrimination analysis. The
TPP also expands upon NAFTA’s performance requirements provisions
in important ways. Similarly to NAFTA, the TPP prohibits certain performance requirements, such as requirements to export a given level or
percentage of goods or services, to accord preference to goods produced
in a signatory’s territory, or achieve a certain level of domestic content.
However, unlike NAFTA, the TPP adds a new element of protection for
governments by permitting parties to adopt certain performance requirements, including environmental measures. According to the performance
requirements provision, provided that the government measures are not
applied in an arbitrary or unjustified manner, and do not constitute a
“disguised restriction or international trade or investment,” host-states
are not prevented from adopted or maintaining measures, “including environmental measures”:
(i) Necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with this Agreement;
(ii) Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; or
(iii) Related to the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.71
In regards to the non-discrimination analysis and performance requirements, TPP expands NAFTA’s police power carve-out by acknowledging the importance of public welfare objectives and allowing for hoststates to adopt or maintain environmental measures as performance requirements.
2. Expropriation and Compensation
Similarly to NAFTA, the TPP permits expropriation for a public
purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with due process
of law, and upon prompt payment of adequate and effective compensation.72 Where the TPP differs, however, is in its further elaboration upon
this right. The TPP provides stronger safeguards to host-states by underscoring that countries can regulate in the public interest, including health,
70
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safety, financial stability, and environmental protection. According to
Annex 9-B, “Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations, except in rare circumstances.”73
3. General Welfare Regulatory Objectives
Unlike NAFTA, Article 9.16 of the TPP preserves the right for
participating governments to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure,
otherwise consistent with Chapter 9, which the government considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity within its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health and other regulatory
objectives.74 Although this marks a significant departure from NAFTA,
Article 9.15 only speaks to environmental or regulatory measures that are
consistent with the TPP’s Investment Chapter, which does appear to
place the right to enact such legislation as secondary to the rights afforded to investors. Even so, Article 9.15 is notable because it is an independent acknowledgement of a host-state’s right to regulate investment
activity for environmental, health, and other general welfare purposes.
4. Arbitration Rules and Procedures
Finally, the TPP further diverges from NAFTA in regards to its
procedural requirements for ISDS claims. The TPP raises the procedural
standards by explicitly discouraging and requiring the dismissal of frivolous suits, and clarifying that the claimant initially bears the burden of
proving all elements of its claims.75 Additionally, the TPP departs from
the generally inaccessible and closed-off nature of ISDS tribunals under
NAFTA by requiring arbitration proceedings to be fully open and transparent, and allowing for the participation of civil society organizations
and other parties not a direct party to the dispute.76 If a party brings forth
a preliminary question on the legal merit of a claim, the TPP also permits
arbiters to award the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.77 In regards to the final award, the arbiters have the final
say in how the tribunal should award costs and attorney’s fees incurred
by the disputing parties in connection with the proceeding.78
Having established a comparative framework of the differences
and similarities between NAFTA and the TPP, the following section will
73
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examine several ISDS cases brought under NAFTA and, specifically,
involving claims that the host-state’s environmental regulations impinged on the investor’s rights. Is the NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence
as pro-investor as ISDS opponents maintain? If so, given the similarities
and differences between the Investment Chapters in NAFTA and the
TPP, will future ISDS claims brought under the TPP produce the same
results as cases brought under NAFTA?
IV. NAFTA’S ISDS JURISPRUDENCE: INVESTOR RIGHTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
Although the decisions made by investment arbitration tribunals
are not binding as precedent, each decision does, in fact, contribute to the
growing body of arbitral jurisprudence that continues to guide the interpretation of the substantive principles of investment protection.79 Investment treaty tribunals might use precedent in different ways, either citing,
following, or distinguishing cases from earlier arbitral awards, but what
has emerged is a static and constantly evolving overarching regime for
international investment relations.
In the several decades that have passed since the emergence of
NAFTA, foreign investors have pursued their fair share of ISDS cases
under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter. Over the years, the accumulation
of ISDS cases has produced a considerable amount of arbitral jurisprudence, which has become increasingly relevant in the current debate over
whether the ISDS provision in the TPP is likely to produce the same results as ISDS claims under NAFTA. Given the striking similarities and
significant differences between NAFTA and the TPP, this section will
discuss four popularly cited investment cases brought under NAFTA in
an effort to build an understanding of NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence
and extrapolate doctrine that will likely be applicable to future claims
brought under the TPP. The cases discussed in this section involved environmental regulations and claims by foreign investors that the regulations violated their treaty-based rights.
Ethyl Corporation v. Canada is one of the first settled, and most
popularly cited, NAFTA Chapter 11 cases.80 In 1996, Ethyl Corp., an
American corporation, initiated a Chapter 11 action against Canada following Canada’s adoption of a law banning the import of the gasoline
additive MMT.81 Ethyl, which was the sole supplier of MMT in Canada,
79
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claimed the Canadian government’s ban on MMT violated the national
treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation provisions under
NAFTA. First, Ethyl argued the MMT ban violated the national treatment requirement in Article 1102 on the grounds that the ban on MMT
imports discriminated against MMT in favor of Canadian producers of
alternative octane enhancers.82 Second, Ethyl asserted that the ban on
MMT also created a de facto performance requirement, prohibited under
Article 1106, to use Canadian sourced MMT or a Canadian produced
alternative.83 Finally, under the prohibition against expropriation, Ethyl
argued that the ban on importing MMT erased about 50 percent of the
corporation’s business in Canada, constituting a de facto expropriation of
its assets, good will, and future earnings.84
In response to Ethyl’s claims, the Canadian government argued
that the ban was motivated by health risks associated with manganese
emissions as well as air quality concerns.85 Additionally, Canada noted
that the much of the United States and Europe had also banned the use of
MMT as a gasoline additive. Ultimately, Canada’s decision to ban the
import and transport of MMT, as opposed to banning its use, weakened
the government’s position that health and environmental concerns were
truly the primary motivations behind the regulation; the MMT ban clearly permitted domestic corporations to continue using and potentially
manufacturing MMT, so long as importation and interprovincial transportation was not involved.
The Ethyl case is commonly brought into the ISDS debate as evidence supporting the assertion that investor-state arbitration essentially
enables investors to compel governments to change their environmental
laws if threatened with weighty arbitration fees and damages. Although
no decision was ever reached by the Ethyl tribunal, anticipating that the
UNCITRAL arbitration panel was likely to decide against it, the Canadian government reversed the ban on MMT import and transport and paid
Ethyl $13 million in legal fees and damages.86 While it is certainly true
that NAFTA does not allow arbiters to require host-states to change their
domestic laws, the result in the Ethyl case undoubtedly suggests that the
mere opportunity to arbitrate disputes has the potential to influence governmental decisions, particularly in the realm of environmental and
health regulations. In essence, a host-state may decide that the potential
costs of losing in arbitration greatly outweigh the costs of reversing the
82
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challenged regulation and negotiating a smaller settlement outside of arbitration.
In Metalclad v. Mexico, the claimant was a U.S. waste disposal
company that had acquired property in the state of San Luis Potosi, Mexico, to operate a landfill in 1993.87 Prior to the Metalclad’s acquisition of
the waste disposal plant, Mexico and the state of San Luis Potosi had
struggle to cope with the extreme amounts of hazardous waste being
generated each year, and opened negotiations with Metalclad to build a
new hazardous waste landfill for the San Luis Potosi area.88 The negotiations resulted in Metalclad receiving approval from the Mexican government to proceed with developing the landfill, which Metalclad completed and opened on March 10, 1995.89 The dispute between Metalclad
and the Mexican government arose shortly after the project’s completion.
Initially, the city of Guadalcazar, where the landfill was located, denied
Metalclad’s municipal construction permit, even though the permit had
been approved thirteen months earlier.90 A few months later, following
failed negotiations between Metalclad and the State of San Luis Potosi to
resolve the permitting issues, the Governor of San Luis Potosi issued an
Ecological Decree declaring a Natural Area for the protection of rare
cactus, which effectively, and permanently, precluded the operation of
the landfill.91
Metalclad filed a Chapter 11 NAFTA complaint against the
Mexican government in January 1997, asserting that the Mexican State
of San Luis Potosi’s ecological zoning law prohibited Metalclad from reopening the waste disposal plant that it has recently purchased, therefore
constituting an expropriation of Metalclad’s assets.92 Metalclad submitted a claim for approximately $43 million on the grounds that actions of
the local and state government wrongfully refused to permit Metalclad’s
subsidiary to open and operate a hazardous waste facility that Metalclad
had built.93 Perhaps the most important of Metalclad’s assertions was that
it had invested in the property in response to the invitation of Mexican
officials, and that the project had met all of the government’s relevant
legal requirements.94 Metalclad based its claim in Article 1100 of
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, arguing that the ecological zoning law amounted
to expropriation, or indirect expropriation, of Metalclad’s investment.
87
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Applying the ICSID rules, the arbitration tribunal concluded that
the Mexican government’s conduct amounted to an expropriation and
awarded Metalclad $16.7.95 In its statement of award, the tribunal clarified that “expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property … but also covert or incidental
interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-beexpected economic benefit of property ... ”96 The decision in Metalclad is
notable because the tribunal seemingly adopted a broad interpretation of
expropriation under Chapter 11, and held the Mexican government liable
for the actions of its political subdivisions, namely the municipal agency
charged with granting permits and the State governor who declared the
ecological decree.97
Five years after the Metalclad ruling, the arbitration tribunal in
Methanex v. United States declared that governments were exempt from
paying compensation for bona fide regulations for the public good.98 Methanex Corporation, a Canadian marketer and distributor of methanol,
contended that a California ban on the use or sale of the gasoline additive
MTBE in California, which uses Methanol as an ingredient, expropriated
parts of Methanex’s investments in the United States. According to Methanex, the California ban on MTBE violated Article 1110 and of Chapter 11, denying it fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law, and denying it National Treatment under Article 1102.99 California, through the United States, claimed that the MTBE ban was enacted to protect public health and to prevent water pollution.100 In response,
Methanex contended that the regulations were not justified on environmental grounds, but merely a creation of political lobbying by a major
competitor in the gasoline additive market — the domestic ethanol industry.101
Applying the UNCITRAL rules and rejecting Methanex’s claim,
the tribunal emphasized the absence of assurances against regulatory
change:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a nondiscriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted
in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter
alias, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed ex95
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propriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to
the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such regulation.102
Thus, in dismissing all of Methanex’s claims, the tribunal clarified that
Chapter 11 did not foreclose upon the possibility of non-compensable
regulations so long as the regulation enacted was done for the public
good and in accordance with due process of law. Unlike Metalclad,
where the government appeared to have misled the investor, no such lack
of due process or transparency was at issue in the claim against California’s MBTE ban.
In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, having been frustrated in
its efforts to mine a portion of the California desert in the vicinity of Native American sacred sites, a Canadian investor filed a Chapter 11 arbitration claim against the United States, alleging injuries relating to a proposed gold mine in southeastern California.103 According to Glamis, it
had invested approximately $15 million in gold mining operations, and
spent 13 out of the 15 million on the project after receiving favorable
signals from various regulatory bodies; however, following its investment in the mining project, California enacted regulations requiring
complete backfilling for all open-out mines in California and for mining
projects located within “one mile of any Native American sacred site,”
which Glamis contended constituted a violation of its rights under Chapter 11.104 Glamis asserted that California and the Department of the Interior had “failed to approve the plan of operation and erected barriers that
have effectively destroyed all economic value of Glamis Imperial’s established mineral rights.”105
The unanimous 355-page decision of the Glamis tribunal has
made a particularly important contribution to NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence. First, in addressing Glamis’ expropriation claim, the tribunal
extensively analyzed the value of the mining project in light of the additional costs that would be required to meet the environmental criteria
demanded by the California regulations, and concluded that the complained of measures would not constitute a sufficient economic impact
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on Glamis to effect an appropriation of its investment.106 The tribunal
reiterated that the first factor in an expropriation claim analysis, namely
sufficient economic impact, had not been met because the calculations
from the enacted measures indicated that the project would maintain a
significant position valuation.
Finally, in addressing Glamis’ final claim, the tribunal concluded
that Glamis had failed to meet the high threshold required to prove a
breach of “fair and equitable standard”.107 The tribunal held that a violation of this right “must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross
denial or justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete
lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons
…” 108
Ultimately, both critics and proponents of ISDS find fodder for
their arguments in the previous decisions of NAFTA tribunals, citing to
examples of cases as either emblematic of the demise of environmental
law or the strengthening of each host-states’ ability to regulate environmental concerns unencumbered.109 While NAFTA’s earlier arbitral jurisprudence arguably appeared to favor investors, a closer look at the facts
and more recent cases reasonably suggests that perhaps an investorfriendly reading of NAFTA jurisprudence is not entirely accurate. The
facts of the earlier cases indicate that host-states could have done more to
avoid misleading or disfavoring investors, and the more recent cases,
such as Glamis, depict a much more challenging threshold for investors
to meet if submitting a claim against a host-state’s environmental policies or regulations.
Having established the historical and legal framework for ISDS,
consisting of the ISDS system’s doctrinal, substantive, and procedural
background, a comparative analysis between the Investment Chapters of
NAFTA and the TPP, and the current state of NAFTA arbitration jurisprudence, this discussion now turns to the substance of the ISDS debate.
In considering the strongest arguments on each side of the debate, the
question then becomes whether the ISDS provision in the TPP will serve
to benefit the financial interests of foreign investors to the detriment of
the local environment, or whether investment arbitration under the TPP
has the potential to benefit both investors, host-states, and the environment.
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V. THE ISDS DEBATE: SEARCHING FOR A MIDDLE GROUND
Given the divisiveness of the ISDS debate, it is easy to engage in
a discussion about ISDS provisions, NAFTA, or the TPP from one side
of the debate or the other. However, the purpose of this discussion is to
engage with the multiple dimensions of the ISDS system, ranging from
its history to current arbitration jurisprudence, so the various arguments
can be contextualized and considered objectively. This section seeks to
bring together the differing perspectives about ISDS by addressing some
of the strongest arguments and opinions from environmentalists and free
trade advocates alike.
A. Arguments Against ISDS
The most common concerns about ISDS involve the legitimacy
of arbitration tribunals, arbitrator accountability, costs, transparency,
award consistency, and more generally the preferential treatment of the
interests of corporations over those of states.110 For most critics, the
vague substantive treaty standards, such as “national treatment” and
“most favored nation,” in addition to the ISDS mechanism through
which they are interpreted and applied, have given foreign investors
greater rights than they would otherwise enjoy under domestic law.111 At
the most basic level, critics view ISDS provisions as giving greater power to foreign investors than nations by permitting investors to file claims
against governments and allowing multinationals to override environmental government policy, as was seen in the Metalclad claim.112
In allowing multinationals to override government regulations,
critics argue ISDS provisions enable corporations to undermine state
sovereignty. As described by Senator Bernie Sanders, the ISDS provision
contained in the TPP undermines the sovereignty of the United States
and “subverts democratically passed laws including those dealing with
labor, health, and the environment.”113 Because ISDS enables foreign
investors to challenge a host-state’s police powers, critics further argue
that ISDS results in a “regulatory chill,” caused by the reluctance of hoststates to impose new regulations when there is a risk foreign investors
will challenge the regulations with investment arbitration.114
110
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Additionally, in determining whether the actions of the host-state
constitutes a “regulatory taking” that requires compensation, or whether
it falls within the host’s “police powers carve-out” for non-compensatory
policies designed to protect the public good, an international arbitration
tribunal may determine the criteria for a regulatory taking according to
the trade agreement and relevant arbitral jurisprudence, which may differ
from what qualifies as a regulatory taking under the host-state’s domestic
laws. In this regard, some policies that would be exempt from compensation under domestic law may be compensatory under the terms of the
investment treaty or prior arbitral decisions. Therefore, according to critics, the inclusion of an ISDS provision in trade agreements arguably
gives foreign investors greater protections than those available under
domestic law.
In regards to the financial benefits allegedly stimulated by free
trade agreements and received by developing countries, some scholars
argue that there is little conclusive evidence that free trade agreements
actually promote foreign direct investment as proponents contend.115 Furthermore, there is a similar lack of conclusive evidence that foreign investors actually need greater protections than domestic laws provide;
while historically concerns about the impartiality of domestic judicial
systems and politics may have been a valid concern, there appear to be
little research or evidence to support this today.116 In this regard, if investors and states are truly concerned about bias, it seems ironic that what
appears to assuage their fears is a dispute resolution system that lacks
uniformity, impartiality, and consistency. In the views of many, “the alleged neutrality of arbitration is . . . a myth.”117
Critics of ISDS have suggested a range of ways to avoid these
difficulties. The first is obviously to remove ISDS provisions from future
agreements entirely. Stemming from this suggestion, in absence of ISDS,
investors have access to political risk insurance that protects them from
losses arising out of expropriation, breach of contract, and denial of justice; the same types of losses that are covered under investment treaties.
In general, critics of ISDS contend that the system as a whole should be
115
See Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business
Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ASPEN
INSTITUTE (William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 587) (finding that there is weak relationship between BITs and foreign-direct investment).
116
See Eric Neumeyer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33(10) World Development, 1567–1585 (2005); MIT,
Are Foreign Firms Privileged by their Host Governments? Evidence from the 2000 World Business
Environment Survey (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4538-05) (providing mixed evidence concerning foreigners’ need for international protection).
117
Pia Eberhardt & Cecelia Olivet, From Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers
are fuelling an investment arbitration boom, Corporate Europe Observatory Report Profiting, at 71
(2012), https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.
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removed from its current stature as a supposed facilitator of international
trade.
B. Arguments in Favor of ISDS
According to proponents of ISDS, arbitration provisions are a
necessary and beneficial aspect of the international community’s increasingly globalized trade regime. ISDS provisions strengthen the rule of law
by requiring host-states to comply with their obligations and providing
legal remedies for disputes, deters governments from imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements on foreign investors, and protects the
rights of governments to regulate in the public interest by reserving the
police power carve-out in both NAFTA and the TPP.118 Essentially, proponents argue that the ISDS system simply gives foreign investors much
needed redress if they are treated unfairly; by protecting the rights of foreign investors, free trade agreements make host-states more credible and,
resultantly, promote foreign direct investment in less developed and accessible local economies. Counter to the assertion that ISDS results in a
“regulatory chill,” proponents argue that an international trade system
without ISDS would result in an “investment chill” much to the detriment of the international community. Because ISDS provisions encourage foreign investors to invest in countries without robust legal systems,
thereby fueling economic growth, foreign investments without the guarantee of investment arbitration would act as an important disincentive for
continued foreign investment in the future.
In response to the argument that ISDS undermines state sovereignty, proponents counter that entering into international treaties of any
kind is a core exercise of sovereign responsibility, rather than an abdication of sovereignty. States have historically negotiated and selected the
terms of international agreements as an exercise of sovereignty. Furthermore, states have also consistently entered into a large variety of treaties,
including trade and investment agreements, because it is not just a nation’s sovereign right to do so, but also the nation’s sovereign duty. In
this regard, investment treaty arbitration ensures that states honor their
obligations to other nations and to their foreign investors, thereby
strengthening the rule of law both domestically and internationally.
Looking to the text of the Investment Chapters in NAFTA and
the TPP, there is a strong argument to be made that the TPP significantly
departs from the NAFTA arbitration regime. First, unlike NAFTA, the
TPP explicitly states that a host-state’s legitimate public welfare objec118
Letter from Paym Akhavan, Associate Professor, McGill University Faculty of Law, et al.,
to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, et al. (April 20, 2015) (on file with Fortier Chair In
International Arbitration & International Commerce Law), https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isdsopen-letter.
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tives may qualify as exceptions to the host-state’s non-discrimination and
minimum standard of treatment obligations. For example, the TPP provides stronger safeguards to host-states by underscoring that countries
can regulate in the public interest, and by permitting host-states to adopt
certain performance requirements, such as environmental measures, that
are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or are related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible resources.
Second, the TPP also raises the procedural bar for foreign investors by
explicitly stating that frivolous suits will be dismissed, clarifying that the
claimant bear the burden of proving all elements of its claim at the outset
of the proceeding, requiring transparency, and permitting the participation of civil society organizations. In general, the text of the TPP does in
fact differ from NAFTA is significant ways, particularly where the hoststate police powers are concerned.
Finally, when specifically looking at NAFTA arbitral jurisprudence, ISDS cases are generally quite rare and corporations do not always come out victorious when arbitrating environmental claims. While
foreign investors are permitted to sue host-state governments for a number of reasons under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, recent NAFTA jurisprudence has clarified that governments will not be held liable for just
any insignificant monetary loss, and that the threshold for establishing a
Chapter 11 claim requires an egregious breach of the investor’s rights.119
Furthermore, in many of the cases where host-states have been required
to pay damages to foreign investors, the host-state government generally
made prior commitments to the foreign investor, which misleads the investor into believing that the investment was protected. Building upon
this jurisprudence, the Metalclad tribunal emphasized that a nondiscriminatory regulation is not compensable unless the government has given
specific commitments to the foreign investor that it would refrain from
such regulation.120 In light of NAFTA’s recent jurisprudence, ISDS provisions arguably strengthen domestic environmental regimes by requiring governments to forecast and plan around environmental regulations
before approving any plans submitted by potential foreign investors.
C. Comparing the Arguments
Considering these arguments together, it is clear that the debate
between environmentalists and advocates of free trade is incredibly challenging because there are valid arguments on each side of the spectrum.
On one hand, it is generally true that investor arbitration provides foreign
investors, mainly multinational corporations, the ability to challenge le119
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gal and regulatory systems and policy choices of the contracting states.
Furthermore, early NAFTA jurisprudence attests to the fact that ISDS
has been used to influence the ability of states to govern in the public
interest, as seen in the Metalclad case. However, it is also true that it is
the sovereign duty of states to enter into international treaties, and a robust investment arbitration system will likely reinforce the rule of law. In
regards to NAFTA’s troubling history, the more recent environmental
claims indicate that investors challenging environmental, health, and
safety regulations must meet a fairly high threshold to establish that a
government’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or would otherwise
violate investment guarantees. Additionally, because the text of the TPP
differs from NAFTA in that it does provide host-states with greater flexibility when it comes to environmental regulations, it is entirely possible
that investors will face increasing difficulties in establishing a claim
against host-states under the TPP.
In seeking to resolve the ISDS debate, it is the opinion of this author that the TPP has the potential to further the interests of both environmentalists and free trade advocates, through both its text and by
building upon NAFTA jurisprudence.
D. Proposed Reforms
A comparative analysis of the texts of NAFTA and the TPP suggests many similarities, but a few important distinctions. As it relates to
this discussion, the TPP mindfully addresses the ability of governments
to regulate in the public interest, and includes several new provisions that
specifically address environmental rights and protections. In regards to
procedural changes, the TPP also explicitly places the burden of bringing
the case against the government on the claimant, who must prove all elements of its claims. Additionally, unlike NAFTA, TPP permits governments to seek expedited review and dismissal of claims that are “manifestly without legal merit.”121 The final portion of this discussion will
suggest a few additional measures that would transform the current investment arbitration system into one that can simultaneously pursue
goals of environmental protection and foreign economic growth.
First, the international community should work towards developing one harmonized set of rules governing investment arbitration, in contrast to the currently fragmented system that permits investors to use a
variety of different arbitration rules, such as UNCITRAL or ICSID. The
multitude of free trade agreements, investment arbitration rules, arbitration forums, and arbiters themselves, clouds the entire investment arbitration system with confusion and inconsistency. The investment com121
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munity should work towards developing a model international investment law, which would include a unified collection of the common rights
provided to investors, obligations of host-states, and a clear description
of the police power carve-out for governments. In addition to a model
international investment law, model rules should also be created for investment arbitration proceedings, which would define unified procedural
and jurisdictional requirements for ISDS cases.
Second, as a procedural change, foreign investors should simply
be required to carry the burden of paying the host-state’s legal fees if the
arbitrators rule in the government’s favor. According to the UN Center
on Trade and Development, which maintains a database of disputes arbitrated under ISDS provisions for all free trade agreements on record, of
the forty-six cases that involved environmental disputes, seven were
awarded in favor of the investor, four in favor of the state, twenty-five
were settled, twenty-four are pending, and three are unknown.122 These
facts clearly indicate that a disproportionate number of these claims are
being settled, likely the result of the prolonged length of these cases, and
arbitration and attorneys’ fees generally being extremely high. The fear
is that governments without ample resources will settle with investors
purely to avoid the costs incurred from arbitration. To diminish the growing trend in settlements, investment arbitration should require the losing
party to pay all attorneys’ fees, while splitting the arbitration fees with
the other party. This procedural requirement has the potential to deter
corporations from pursuing frivolous lawsuits, and encourage governments to refrain from reaching quick and expensive settlements.
Finally, addressing substantive reforms, legitimate environmental regulations should be recognized as a non-compensable regulatory
taking, in both the text of free trade agreements and within customary
international law. While it is true that the TPP carves out a much broader
police power for governments regulating in the public interest, environmental regulations that are enacted out of this power should be explicitly
recognized as non-compensable. For example, in the context of free trade
agreements, drafters could include a provision that states environmental
regulations are non-compensable and take precedence over the rights of
foreign investors if that policy was found to be consistent with the findings and recommendations of a recognized international environmental
body, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or consistent with governing principles of customary international law.
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CONCLUSION
A robust ISDS system has the potential to strengthen environmental regulations and increase foreign investment, particularly when
applied to free trade agreements, such as the TPP, that have already expanded the power of host-states to regulate for environmental purposes.
First, because NAFTA jurisprudence suggests that states might be liable
under ISDS provisions if they renege upon “specific assurances” given to
prospective investors, host-states should be encouraged to give more
consideration to forecasting future environmental regulation before entering into agreements with investors.123 Second, the expropriation provision in NAFTA and the TPP does not require compensation for all government regulations, only those that are not for a public purpose and administered in a discriminatory manner. Although this has been applied
inconsistently to environmental regulations, NAFTA jurisprudence suggests that environmental regulations that have been adopted openly and
applied equally to all investors do not require compensation.
In conclusion, if free trade agreements included a provision allowing any environmental policy to take precedent over the rights of foreign investors if the policy was found to be consistent with the findings
and recommendations of a recognized international environmental body,
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, governments
would be more incentivized to engage with international recommendations and legislate in pursuit of environmental goals. For these three reasons, in the context of ISDS, it is beneficial for governments to be forthright, transparent, informed, and proactive when implementing or even
considering environmental regulations.
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